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1. Introduction
Much of the recent debate as to the criteria which determine whether a charge is 
properly characterised as fixed or floating has revolved around charges over book 
debts or other receivables. Charges over chattels have received somewhat less 
attention, even though an attempt to create a fixed charge over chattels gives rise to
interesting questions, some of which do not arise when the collateral consists simply
of receivables. While some of these questions have received judicial attention in 
recent years, others are only now starting to be considered. In this paper, we provide 
an overview of some of the most important factors which would have to be taken into 
account when advice is sought as to whether a charge over chattels is fixed or 
floating. The paper also brings to bear upon this issue principles from other parts of 
legal doctrine, the relevance of which has not so far been noticed in this context.
Where there is a conflict in the authorities, we present our view as to where lies the 
balance of arguments. We also explain the method to be employed when a debenture 
is construed in order to determine the proper characterisation of a charge contained in 
it, paying particular attention to the relevance of the conduct of the parties subsequent 
to its execution. The paper concludes by summarising our discussion in the form of 
nine propositions.
In determining whether the provisions contained in a document have created a 
floating or a fixed charge security over certain assets, it is necessary to establish the 
essential features of the two species of security. 
2. The essential characteristic of a floating charge
The classic description of the characteristics of a floating charge is that of Romer LJ 
in Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Association Limited:1
“I certainly do not intend to attempt to give an exact definition of the term 
‘floating charge’, nor am I prepared to say that there will not be a floating 
charge… which does not contain all the three characteristics that I am about to 
mention, but I certainly think that if a charge has the three characteristics that I 
am about to mention it is a floating charge. (1.) If it is a charge on a class of 
assets of a company present and future; (2.) if that class is one which, in the 
ordinary course of the business of the company, would be changing from time 
to time; and (3.) if you find that by the charge it is contemplated that, until 
some future step is taken by or on behalf of those interested in the charge, the 
company may carry on its business in the ordinary way as far as concerns the 
particular class of assets I am dealing with.”
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2As explained by Lord Millett,2 the first two characteristics referred to by Romer LJ, 
while typical of a floating charge, do not necessitate the conclusion that the charge is 
a floating one. It is the third characteristic “which is the hallmark of a floating charge 
and serves to distinguish it from a fixed charge”. As Vaughn Williams LJ stated in the 
Yorkshire Woolcombers case,3
“[W]hat you do require to make a specific security is that the security 
whenever it has once come into existence, and been identified or appropriated 
as a security, shall never thereafter at the will of the mortgagor cease to be a 
security. If at the will of the mortgagor he can dispose of [the asset] and 
prevent its being any longer a security, although something else may be 
substituted more or less for it, that is not a ‘specific security’.”
This approach has received modern confirmation at the highest level. It was followed 
by Millett LJ in Re Cosslett (Contractors) Limited:4
“The essence of a floating charge is that it is a charge, not on any particular 
asset, but on a fluctuating body of assets which remain under the management 
and control of the chargor, and which the chargor has the right to withdraw 
from the security despite the existence of the charge. The essence of a fixed 
charge is that the charge is on a particular asset or class of assets which the 
chargor cannot deal with free from the charge without the consent of the 
chargee. The question is not whether the chargor has complete freedom to 
carry on his business as he chooses, but whether the chargee is in control of 
the charged assets.”
The same approach was also adopted by the Privy Council in the Brumark case,5
which in turn was followed by the House of Lords in Smith (Administrator of Cosslett 
(Contractors) Limited v Bridgend County Borough Council, where Lord Hoffmann
stated:6
“[B]ecause the property subject to [the charge in the Cosslett case] 
(constructional plant, temporary works, goods and materials on the site) was a 
2 Agnew v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2001] 2 AC 710 (“Brumark”) at 719G, [13]. Although 
this is a decision of the Privy Council on appeal from the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, it is highly 
persuasive authority. While the Court of Appeal in In re Spectrum Plus Limited. [2004] EWCA Civ 
670 (“Spectrum”) has refused to follow Brumark, it is submitted that this does not detract from the 
weight of the Privy Council’s judgment for the issues at hand, on the following grounds: (1) The ambit 
of the Spectrum decision is restricted to security over book debts. The effect of the Court of Appeal’s 
decision is merely that a security interest in book debts is capable of being a fixed charge as long as the 
debenture prohibits the chargor from disposing of the books debts prior to collection, and as long as the 
chargor, upon collecting the book debts, is required to deposit them in its bank account with the
chargee itself. (2) The Court of Appeal in Spectrum considered itself bound by its previous decision in 
Re New Bullas Trading Limited [1994] 1 BCLC 48. Once again, the effect of this decision is restricted 
to charges over book debts. (3) The Court of Appeal in Spectrum were not referred to Smith 
(Administrator of Cosslett (Contractors) Limited v Bridgend County Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 
710, a case concerning chattels rather than book debts, where Lord Hoffmann, at [41], approved of the 
Privy Council’s decision; an extract from this passage is provided in the text.
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3fluctuating body of assets which could be consumed or… removed from the 
site in the ordinary course of the [chargor’s] business, it was a floating 
charge”.
It follows that a charge is likely to be construed as one floating over a fluctuating 
body of assets which remain under the management and control of the chargor if the 
relevant instrument “contemplates that the [debtor] company will from time to time in 
the future and in the ordinary course of its business change its plant, machinery, 
fixtures, fittings and ancillary equipment”.7
3. The essential characteristic of a fixed charge
As regards the extent to which the chargor must be ‘free’ to deal with the assets 
(without recourse to the chargee) such as to indicate that the security created is 
floating charge security as opposed to fixed charge security, where under the terms of 
the relevant security the chargor had the freedom (or it is clear that that is what was 
intended) to deal and dispose of the assets in the ordinary course of business, the 
charge will be construed as a floating charge as opposed to a fixed charge.8 (What 
constitutes the ordinary course of business is considered below.) However, the 
existence of certain restrictions on dealing with an asset may not necessarily be 
inconsistent with a charge being a floating charge.9
Similarly, a certain element of control over particular assets on the part of the chargor 
is not necessarily inconsistent with those assets being subject to a fixed charge.10 The 
existence of a power vested in the chargor to substitute charged property for the 
purposes of maintenance, alteration or improvement does not necessarily imply that 
the charge is floating. Authority for this may be found in Holroyd v Marshall11 and 
Seed v Bradley.12 However, it is important to note that the chargor’s power to remove 
assets from the security is consistent with the security being a fixed charge only if 
both of the following conditions are met: (a) the power is limited to the situation 
where the assets are to be repaired or improved, and (b) the power is one of 
substitution, or in other words, it consists of a power to remove assets from the 
7 Re Armagh Shoes Limited [1984] BCLC 405, per Hutton J at 408E-F. In holding that the deed in that 
case purporting to create a fixed charge had nevertheless created a floating charge, his Lordship was 
impressed by the wording of the relevant clause which referred to “all… plant machinery fixtures 
fittings and ancillary equipment now or at any time hereafter belonging to the mortgagor” (emphasis 
added). The learned judge concluded, at 419c-d, that “it is a necessary implication from the deed that 
the company was to have the right or licence to deal with the assets, comprised within the ambit of the 
charge, in the ordinary course of its business until the [creditor] decided to enforce the charge.”
8
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and Royal Trust Bank v National Westminster Bank plc [1996] BCLC 682, per Millett LJ at 704 and 
706.
9 Re ASRS Establishment Limited (in Administrative Receivership and in Liquidation) [2000] 2 BCLC 
631, per Walker LJ at 637 and 640; Re Cosslett (Contractors) Limited [1998] Ch 495, per Millett LJ at 
510; Re GE Tunbridge Limited [1995] 1 BCLC 34, per Sir Mervyn Davies at 39; and Re Brightlife 
Limited [1987] Ch 200, per Hoffmann J at 209.
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4security coupled with a duty to acknowledge that the substitutes of those assets fall
within the ambit of the security.13
The second condition in particular is crucial to the nature of the fixed charge. The 
holder of a fixed charge gains an immediate property right in the particular asset 
subjected to the charge, which is not defeated by the chargor’s unilateral attempt to 
dispose of those assets.14 As a result, an asset acquired in substitution for the charged 
asset is automatically subject, in the chargor’s hands, to the property right of the 
chargee.15 The reasoning of the courts in Holroyd and Seed, in insisting upon the need 
for substituted assets to be considered within the ambit of the security, is based on the 
recognition of this persistence of the property rights of the fixed charge holder. By 
contrast, the holder of a floating charge acquires rights in the fund constituted by the 
relevant assets, and not in any particular asset itself, since his rights “hover” or “float” 
over the assets until the charge crystallises.16 Since the removal in the ordinary course 
of business of assets from that fund releases them altogether from the rights of the 
floating charge holder, any assets (or indeed monies) acquired in substitution are not, 
qua substitutes, covered by the floating charge.17 It follows that an agreement by the 
parties that charged assets may unilaterally be put outside of the security by the 
chargor and that assets acquired in substitution for them are not to be considered part 
of the security is inconsistent with their having created a fixed charge, and consistent 
with their having created a floating charge.  
In Re Cimex Tissues Limited,18 the company in question had purported to create a 
fixed charge over the machinery it used to produce toilet rolls, and over a forklift 
truck specifically modified for use in its business. The badly drafted debenture19
appeared to give the company the power to sell, mortgage or otherwise deal with the 
charged property in the ordinary course of business. The question was whether the 
charge created was fixed or floating. The court held the charge to be fixed.
In reading the learned judge’s decision, it is important to bear in mind the following 
points. First, the debenture appeared to be internally inconsistent, so that the court had 
to decide which of its parts reflected the true intentions of the parties. Second, on its 
proper construction, the debenture did not confer on the company power to deal with20
or sell21 any part of the charged property without the chargee’s consent. However, the 
judge concluded that even if the company had had a unilateral power to dispose of the 
charged property, he would have been minded to hold the charge to be fixed rather 
13
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14
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5than floating.22 All aspects of the judgment dealing with whether the charge could be 
fixed even though the company had been given the power to remove assets from the 
ambit of the charge without the chargee’s consent therefore constitute obiter dicta. 
Third, in reaching this decision, the judge was influenced by his reluctance to allow 
the “unequivocal words of [the relevant clause] explicitly referring to a fixed charge, 
[to] be overridden by what is in the present debenture a highly ambiguous and 
uncertain provision for sale…”23
Finally and significantly, the learned judge purported to follow Holroyd v Marshall
and Seed v Bradley. However and as already noted, the reasoning of the courts in 
these cases turned on the chargor’s unilateral power being restricted (a) to the 
circumstances where the charged assets needed to be repaired, maintained or 
improved, and (b) by an explicit acknowledgement that the substitute assets would 
fall within the ambit of the charge. Neither of these requirements was in fact satisfied 
by the debenture before the court. The judge considered this difference to be relevant 
only as “to the commercial sense of the transaction from the point of view of the 
chargee, rather than the legal classification of the charge created.”24 For the reasons 
explained above, however, it is respectfully submitted that this proposition must be 
open to considerable doubt. This, coupled with the fact that the discussion concerning 
the nature of the charge where the chargor has the unilateral power to dispose of the 
collateral constituted obiter dicta, suggests that the judgment does not constitute even
a persuasive authority for the proposition that such a charge may nevertheless be
properly characterised as a fixed rather than a floating charge.
4. The purpose and quality of the chargee’s control
The purpose for which control is exercised over the collateral, the capacity in which 
the person exercising control does so, and whether he may do so consistently with his 
other legal obligations, all are crucial factors in determining whether the charge is a 
fixed one. Let us take these in turn.
In In re Cosslett (Contractors) Limited,25 the chargee Council claimed that it had a 
fixed charge over a coal washing plant by virtue of the fact (among others) that the 
plant could not be removed from the site without the permission of an engineer, who 
would make the decision on the basis of whether or not the plant was required for the 
completion of the works on site. This claim was rejected. It was material to the Court 
of Appeal’s decision26 to regard the charge over the coal washing plant as floating that 
this “restriction [did not] have any relation to the council’s security. The council’s 
purpose in imposing the restriction was not to protect its security but to ensure that the 
company would give proper priority to the completion of the works.”27
In Re Double S Printers Limited,28a company had granted a debenture to one of its 
own directors containing what purported to be a fixed charge over present and future 
22
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25 [1998] Ch. 495.
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6book debts and a floating charge over the rest of its property. Before Jonathan Parker 
J, the director argued that “the necessary element of control ha[d] at all material times 
been present de facto in that, as director of the company and one of the two 
signatories under the company’s bank mandate, [the director] at all material times 
exercised actual control over the book debts”.29 The court rejected this argument:30
“In order for the debenture to take effect as a fixed charge over present and 
future book debts, there must, it seems to me, be some right of control over the 
debts, or their proceeds, exercisable by [the director] in his capacity as 
chargee, and not in some other capacity, e.g. as a director of the company. 
The opportunity for [the director] to exercise de facto control of the 
company’s bank account in his capacity as a director of the company is, in my 
view, nihil ad rem… In any event, as a director, [he] was at all material times 
under a fiduciary duty to the company to act bona fide in the interests of the 
company, and not for a collateral purpose such as the maintenance of his rights 
as chargee.”
5. The relevance of the nature of the charged assets
The nature of the assets sought to be charged is also relevant to the issue of how ‘free’
the chargor is to deal with those assets, and therefore, to whether the security to which 
those assets are said to be subject is fixed or floating charge security.31 For example, a 
charge expressed to be a fixed charge over stock in trade or raw materials is normally 
construed by the courts as being a floating charge. Since the assets in question 
constitute a highly fluctuating body of assets which will, by necessity, be used, in the 
sense of being disposed of or consumed, in the ordinary course of the chargor’s 
business, the implication is that the chargor has the ability to deal with the relevant 
assets in the ordinary course of its business without recourse to the chargee. The 
courts here are doing no more than recognising the commercial reality of the position: 
to hold that essentially circulating assets of this sort are subject to a fixed charge 
would be to require that they could not be used in the chargor’s business in the normal 
way without the chargee’s consent, which would result in the paralysis of the former.
Importantly, however, the converse is not true. A charge may be a floating one even 
though it is over assets which do not form part of the circulating capital of the debtor 
company. In Re ASRS Establishment Limited (in administrative receivership and 
liquidation),32 the question concerned the status of a purported fixed charge over 
money held in an escrow account. In confirming Park J’s decision at first instance that 
the charge was floating, Walker LJ on behalf of the Court of Appeal said that “[t]he 
fact that this particular item was not a regular or reliable source of working capital 
seems to me irrelevant.”33 In Cosslett itself, the charge was held to be floating even 
though it was over (among other things) the coal washing plant which constituted a 
central part of the chargor’s fixed capital structure.34
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7In ascertaining what, if any, significance is to be accorded to the nature of the assets, 
helpful guidance is provided by the recent judgment of Etherton J in Ashborder BV v 
Green Gas Power Limited.35 His Lordship indicated36 that in construing whether the 
chargee has sufficient control over the charged assets for the charge to be considered 
as fixed, the court will first look at the ordinary and natural meaning of the words in
the debenture in order to ascertain whether the chargor has been given a unilateral 
power to dispose of the assets in the ordinary course of its business. If it has, then the 
charge is floating, not fixed. It is only if, upon its true construction, the debenture is 
silent as to whether the chargor has this power that the court will turn to examine the 
charged assets in order to determine whether or not they fall into a category of assets 
which could sensibly only have been subjected to a floating charge.
6. The ambit of the ordinary course of business
In Ashborder, Etherton J had to consider whether certain transactions were within the 
ordinary course of the debtor company’s business so as to fall within its power 
unilaterally to deal with assets subject to the floating charge. His Lordship 
summarised his examination of English and Commonwealth authorities on the issue 
thus:37
“I do not propose to attempt any particular formulation of the test for 
determining whether a transaction falls within the ordinary course of a 
company's business for the purpose of a floating charge, or to make any 
comprehensive statement of the criteria for determining when a transaction is 
to be held to have taken place in the ordinary course of business for that 
purpose. On the other hand, it may be helpful to summarise briefly the 
following conclusions that I have reached from the decided cases that I have 
reviewed: (1) The question whether a particular transaction is within the 
ordinary course of a company's business in the context of a floating charge is a 
mixed question of fact and law; (2) it is convenient to approach the matter in a 
two stage process; (3) first, to ascertain, as a matter of fact, whether an 
objective observer, with knowledge of the company, its memorandum of 
association and its business, would view the transaction as having taken place 
in the ordinary course of its business, and, if so (4) second, to consider 
whether, on the proper interpretation of the document creating the floating 
charge, applying standard techniques of interpretation, the parties nonetheless 
did not intend that the transaction should be regarded as being in the ordinary 
course of the company's business for the purpose of the charge; (5) subject to 
any such special considerations resulting from the proper interpretation of the 
charge document, there is no reason why an unprecedented or exceptional 
transaction cannot, in appropriate circumstances, be regarded as in the 
ordinary course of the company's business; (6) subject to any such special 
considerations, the mere fact that a transaction would, in a liquidation, be 
liable to be avoided as a fraudulent or otherwise wrongful preference of one 
35
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36
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8creditor over others, does not, of itself, necessarily preclude the transaction 
from being in the ordinary course of the company's business; (7) nor does the 
mere fact that a transaction was made in breach of fiduciary duty by one or 
more directors of the company; (8) such matters in (6) and (7) may, however, 
where appropriate and [sic] in all the circumstances, be among the factors 
leading to the conclusion that the transaction was not in the ordinary course of 
the company's business; (9) transactions which are intended to bring to an end, 
or have the effect of bringing to an end, the company's business are not 
transactions in the ordinary course of its business.”
Of particular relevance is his Lordship’s treatment of the question whether disposals 
of assets covered by the charge to raise money towards the continuation of the 
chargor’s business could be regarded as being in the ordinary course:38
“The proper starting point is that the words in the expression ‘ordinary course 
of its… business’ are ordinary words of the English language which must be 
given the meaning which ordinary business people in the position of [the 
parties to the relevant debentures] would be expected to give them against the 
factual and commercial background in which those documents were made… 
[S]uch businessmen would not be likely to take so narrow a view of ‘ordinary 
course of business’ that it would not embrace a transaction for the preservation 
and continuance of a company’s business, merely because it was not a 
transaction that had ever been carried out before… As Mahoney JA 
observed[39], Borax[40] is, indeed, English Court of Appeal authority that a 
transaction may be in the ordinary course of business even if it is exceptional 
or unprecedented.”
It is submitted that the quoted passages have important implications for answering the 
question whether a charge is fixed or floating. A contention that the nature of the 
assets charged is such that they would not in the ordinary course of business be 
disposed of by the debtor company is to be tested as follows. At the first stage, it 
would have to be ascertained whether “an objective observer with knowledge of the 
company, its memorandum of association, and its business” might take the view that 
those assets might be dealt with in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business. It 
would be open to this observer to conclude that it would be in the ordinary course of 
business of a financially distressed company to raise money in order to continue its 
business, for example, either (a) when it has several units of the same type of asset, by 
selling off some units, which sales, while cutting down the debtor company’s
productive capacity, would allow it to continue operating, or (b) to arrange for a sale 
and leaseback of some of the charged property. The second stage would involve an 
examination of the debenture containing the charge which was to be characterised.
The process of settling upon its true construction would give require giving due 
weight to the finding at the first stage as to whether the collateral consists of such 
assets as were capable of being disposed of in the ordinary course of the chargor’s 
business.
7. Identifying the charged property
38
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9It is essential that the instrument creating a fixed charge identifies the charged 
property with sufficient specificity. This is important for two reasons. First, the 
creation of a fixed charge grants an immediate property right in the specific assets 
charged to the chargee. This carving out and transferring away of property rights from 
the chargor’s title to those assets can only take place if the assets have been identified 
clearly enough for the instrument to act upon the chargor’s title.41 Secondly, the 
existence of a fixed charge requires the chargee to exercise effective control over the 
charged assets, and in particular, requires it to monitor certain types of dealings with 
them by the chargor.42 Such monitoring cannot take place, and thus, the requisite
control cannot be exercised, unless (at the very least) the parties are aware of the 
identity of assets the chargor’s ability to deal with which has been made conditional 
upon the chargee’s consent having been sought and given.43
For both these reasons, it follows that where a debenture purports to create a fixed 
charge over a broadly defined category of assets, it will succeed in doing so only to 
the extent that the parties identify with sufficient precision, for example through a 
schedule or register, the particular assets that are to form the subject matter of the 
grant.44
8. ‘All or nothing’
If a clause in a debenture purports to create a fixed charge over assets some of which 
clearly could not have been intended to be subjected to such a charge, then the entire 
clause is likely to be interpreted as having created a floating charge. In Re G E 
Tunbridge Limited,45 a debenture purported to create (among other things) a fixed 
charge over “[a]ll other assets (not being Floating Assets) now owned or hereafter 
acquired by the Chargor or in which it now has or in the future acquires an interest” 
(“the para 2 assets”). Many of these assets (“the auction chattels”) had been auctioned 
by the time that the matter came before the court. In deciding that the charge in fact 
created was floating and not fixed, Sir Mervyn Davies said:46
“I bear in mind that the para 2 assets include not only such assets as the 
chattels that were sold by auction but also intangible assets such as book 
debts…I cannot see that the debenture was apt to create a specific charge over 
the company’s book debts… [W]hen one looks at the range of chattels 
itemised in the auction particulars it is, in my view, unrealistic to suppose that 
41
 See e.g. Re Goldcorp Exchange Limited (in receivership) [1995] 1 AC 74, per Lord Mustill 
delivering the Privy Council’s advice, at 89-90, and at 95, where the fixed charge case of Holroyd v 
Marshall (1862) 10 HL Cas 191 is distinguished from the facts before the Privy Council as being 
“concerned with situations where the goods upon acquisition could be unequivocally identified with the 
individual contract relied upon.” See also Illingworth v Houldsworth [1904] AC 355, per Lord 
Macnaghten at 358: “A specific charge… is one that without more fastens on ascertained and definite 
property or property capable of being ascertained and defined.”
42
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43
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44
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a considerable number of the auction chattels would not or might not be 
changed or removed from time to time… My conclusion is that the document 
as a whole discloses a situation in which a floating charge arises over the para 
2 assets…”
In Re ASRS Establishment Limited (in administrative receivership and liquidation),47
the Court of Appeal was faced with construing the effect of (among other things) the 
following clause (“clause 2.1(v)”):
“[ASRS]… charges by way of fixed charge all book debts, bank account credit 
balances and other debts and claims now or at any time during the continuance 
of this security due or owing to [ASRS]…”
At first instance, Park J had held that the:48
“… critical point is that the subparagraph cannot be read so as to create a fixed 
charge over some of the ‘other debts and claims’ but a floating charge over 
others of the ‘other debts and claims’. It is all or nothing. Either it creates a 
fixed charge over all the other debts and claims, or it creates a fixed charge 
over none of them. I believe that analysis is correct as a matter of construction 
of the debenture. It is also consistent with the decision of Sir Mervyn Davies 
in Re G E Tunbridge Limited…”
In the leading judgment in the Court of Appeal, Robert Walker LJ did not consider it 
necessary to decide the issue. However, his Lordship stated that while he was unable 
to accept the ‘all or nothing’ view without reservation, this view is likely to prevail in 
practice when debentures are construed, “even if it is not requisite as a matter of legal 
analysis.”49
The ‘all or nothing’ view is also consistent with Lord Hoffmann’s approach in Smith 
(Administrator of Cosslett (Contractors) Limited) v Bridgend County Borough 
Council.50 The House of Lords here had to decide (among other things) whether a
clause created a fixed or a floating charge over a coal washing plant.51 It was argued 
before their Lordships that while the clause “might create a floating charge over 
materials and small items of plant which were more obviously likely to come and go 
during the course of a four-year contract, it should be construed as a fixed charge over 
the washing plant, which was unlikely to be removed and received a separate mention 
in [a different provision in the debenture.]”52 Lord Hoffmann rejected this argument
on the basis that it was “impossible to construe [the clause] as creating a charge over 
the washing plant different in nature from that which it created over the other plant 
and materials brought on site.”53
47
 [2000] 2 BCLC 631. 
48
 [2000] 1 BCLC 727, 737a-c.
49
 [2000] 2 BCLC 631, at [29-[31].
50
 [2001] UKHL 58; [2002] 1 AC 336. The Court of Appeal’s decision in In re ASRS Establishment 
Limited was cited to their Lordships.
51
 The clause may be found at [2002] 1 AC 336, 345-346 at [10].
52
 [2002] 1 AC 336, 353 at [44].
53 Ibid., at 353 at [44]. See also Re Armagh Shoes Limited [1984] BCLC 405, per Hutton J at 419, 
where his Lordship said, “It was not seriously argued that the charge could be fixed in respect of some 
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9. The parties’ objective and subjective intentions
So much for the substance of the distinction between fixed and floating charges. The
process of ascertaining the legal nature of a charge begins with the construction of the 
debenture.54 Construction is a matter of mixed fact and law.55 It may be approached in 
two stages which, in this context, were first formalised by Millett LJ in Orion Finance 
Limited v Crown Financial Management Limited, 56 and authoritatively restated by the 
Privy Council, speaking through Lord Millett, in Brumark.57 The first stage, which we 
call ascertainment, is concerned with questions of fact, and consists of the 
construction of the debenture with a view to ascertaining the objective intentions of 
the parties.58 The aim at this stage is not to discover whether the parties subjectively 
intended to create a fixed or a floating charge. The point, instead, is to identify what 
rights the parties intended to bestow on each other and by what obligations they 
intended to be bound (for example, whether the chargor would be required to seek the 
chargee’s consent before engaging in certain types of dealings with the charged 
assets). The label attached to the charge by the parties provides some, though not 
particularly probative, evidence as to their intentions. The second stage, which we call 
categorisation, is concerned with questions of law and operates independently of the 
parties’ intentions. It consists of an analysis of their rights and obligations under the 
relevant document, as it has been interpreted at the first stage, in order to determine 
whether the charge created is fixed or floating. Since it is the document as a whole 
which governs this question, it follows that if, upon its true construction, “the effect of 
the document as a whole is inconsistent with the terminology which the parties have 
used, then their ill-chosen language must yield to the substance.”59
10. Post-contractual conduct
In Brumark, in commenting upon the importance of the chargee’s control over the 
collateral, Lord Millett stated that a requirement that the chargor pays over the 
proceeds of certain book debts into a blocked account with the charge holder would 
constitute sufficient control for the charge over those books debts to be characterised 
as fixed. Lord Millett then went on to say this on behalf of the Privy Council: 
of the assets and a floating charge in respect of the remainder of the assets and I consider that there is 
no basis for such an argument.” 
54
 On contractual interpretation generally, see Investors’ Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich 
Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 .
55
 “The expression ‘construction’ as applied to a document… includes two things; first the meaning of 
the words and secondly their legal effect, or the effect to be given to them. The meaning of the words I 
take to be a question of fact in all cases, whether we are dealing with a poem or a legal document. The 
effect of the words used is a question of law”, per Lindley LJ in Chatenay v Brazilian Submarine 
Telegraph Company Limited [1891] 1 QB 79, 85.
56 [1996] 2 BCLC 78, 84a-e.
57
 [2001] 3 WLR 454, 460. This approach has recently been followed by Etherton J in Ashborder BV v 
Green Gas Power Limited [2004] EWHC 1517 at [163] et seq.; see in particular at [181] and [183].
58
 Objective intentions are those embodied in the words of the relevant document (Smith v Lucas (1881) 
18 Ch D 531, 542), the “intentions as expressed” (Inland Revenue Commissioners v Raphael [1935] 
AC 96, 142).
59 Orion Finance Limited v Crown Financial Management Limited [1996] 2 BCLC 78, per Millett LJ at 
84e.
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“their Lordships would wish to make it clear that it is not enough to provide in 
the debenture that the account is a blocked account if it is not operated as one 
in fact.”60
This dictum, suggesting that enquiries might have to be made not just into the terms 
of the debenture but also into the way that the account would in fact have been
operated, raises interesting questions. It is a well established principle that, in general,
any conduct of the parties (whether by words or actions) occurring after entry into an 
agreement is inadmissible as an aid to construction of that agreement.61 It follows 
that, in general, the conduct of the parties after the execution of the debenture is 
irrelevant as to the issue whether it creates a fixed or a floating charge. This has been 
frequently confirmed.62 So what is the significance of post-contractual conduct? This 
Section investigates what Lord Millett might have had in mind when he uttered the 
dictum noted above.63
We suggest that post-contractual conduct can only be relevant to the proper 
characterisation of a charge in one of five situations. The first two arise where the 
debenture is alleged to be a sham or a mere pretence, respectively, and in either case, 
the post-contractual conduct of the parties would be examined in order to ascertain the 
rights and obligations that they had in fact intended to create.64 A sham consists of 
“acts done or documents executed by the parties… which are intended by them to 
give to third parties or to the court the appearance of creating between the parties 
legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if 
any) which the parties intend to create.”65 What is crucial here is that “all the parties 
thereto must have a common intention that the acts or documents are not to create the 
legal rights and obligations which they give the appearance of creating."66 A mere 
pretence is also an act done or document executed that does not represent the true 
nature of the agreement. There is, however, no requirement here that the parties be 
colluding in order to disguise this nature. It is sufficient that one of the parties intends 
to do so, with the other merely concurring in the purported terms of the agreement 
because it does not properly understand them, or because it is driven by circumstances 
to assent to those terms.67 This distinction will be important, for example, where it is 
the company itself which, wishing unilaterally to dispose of the charged assets, 
challenges the charge-holder’s claim that the charge is a fixed one. An argument on 
its behalf that the agreement is a sham might be met with the response that it cannot 
plead its own illegality in asking the court to depart from the explicit terms of the 
60
 [2001] 2 AC 710, 73B, [48]  (added emphasis). 
61 Whitworth Street Estates v Miller [1970] AC 583 .
62
 See Re William Gaskell Limited [1994] 1 BCLC 197; Re Armagh Shoes Limited [1984] BCLC 405; 
and Re Wogan’s (Drogheda) Limited [1993] IR 157.
63
 See also the discussion of the “external route” to the interpretation of the parties’ agreement in 
Staughton LJ’s judgment in Welsh Development Agency v Export Finance Company Limited [1992] 
BCLC 148, at 187.
64
 Whether something is a sham or a pretence is a question of pure fact; Bankway Properties Limited v 
Penfold-Dunsford [2001] EWCA Civ 528, [2001] 1 WLR 1369, per Arden LJ at [52].
65 Snook v London and West Riding Investments Limited [1967] 2 QB 786, 802 (Diplock LJ).
66 Ibid. 
67 Antoniades v Villiers [1990] 1 AC 417 , 462G-463G (Lord Templeman). For endorsements of this 
distinction, see e.g. Aslan v Murphy [1989] 3 All ER 130, 133c-h (Lord Donaldson MR, speaking for 
the Court of Appeal), Burdis v Livsey [2002] EWCA Civ 510, [2003] QB 36, [32] (Aldous LJ, speaking 
for the Court of Appeal), and Debenhams Retail Plc v  The Commissioners of Customs and Excise
[2004] EWHC 1540, [112] (Lindsay J).
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debenture.68 Such a problem would not arise where the chargor can rely on the claim 
(which in most circumstances would be more appropriate on the facts anyway) that 
the relevant provisions of the debenture were a pretence, the company’s need for 
funding having rendered it helpless to resist whatever terms might have been imposed 
upon it by the proposed creditor. 
The third situation concerns the claim that the terms of the debenture in question have
been varied by the conduct of the parties after its execution, the fourth arises where it 
is alleged that the benefit of certain of the terms in the debenture has been waived by 
the appropriate party, and the fifth concerns the situation where one party has become 
estopped from asserting a certain right. What distinguishes the first two situations 
where post-agreement conduct is relevant from the remaining three is that, in the 
former, the conduct of the parties is relevant because it provides evidence as to the 
intentions of the parties as at the time of entry into the agreement, whereas in the 
latter, the conduct is examined, insofar as relevant, to throw light on the parties’ 
intentions at the time when they engaged in the relevant conduct. 
While variation on the one hand and waiver and estoppel on the other are often treated 
as identical, the Court of Appeal has recently pointed out that they must be carefully 
distinguished, since (a) variation by conduct alters the obligations to be performed 
under the terms of the agreement, whereas waiver and estoppel merely affect the 
remedies available to the party for the breach of those terms; and (b) variation 
requires the presence of offer, acceptance and certainty of terms, the usual elements of 
contract formation, whereas waiver and estoppel do not.69
Consider the effect of variation first. Suppose that the debenture on its terms does not 
allow the chargor the right to engage in unilateral dealings with the collateral, but 
subsequent to the execution of the debenture, the chargor has openly dealt with the 
charged assets without the chargee’s consent and the latter has continued its lending 
facilities without raising any objections. If the conditions for an effective variation are 
satisfied, then the charge, which might properly be characterised as fixed according to 
the terms of the debenture,70 would now fall to be classified as floating. What is more, 
it is arguable that since this variation by conduct has brought a new (floating) charge 
into existence, this charge might have to be duly registered.71 Failure to register 
would, on this view, render it void as against the liquidator, administrator or any 
creditor of the chargor. Note also that, after the variation, if the chargor in the normal 
course of its business grants property rights in the charged assets to a third party, the 
latter is unencumbered by the chargee’s rights.
The difference in this context between a waiver of the right to veto the removal of an 
asset from the ambit of the charge, and being estopped from doing so, lies in whether 
the right to veto is lost permanently, or whether a particular breach of that right is 
68
 In some situations, the chargee’s argument might be defeated on the grounds identified in Tribe v 
Tribe [1996] Ch 107 .
69 Glencore Grain Limited v Flacker Shipping Limited (The "Happy Day") [2002] EWCA Civ 1068, 
[2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 896, [61]-[68].
70
 See above, as to the significance of the chargee’s control over the collateral.
71
 Companies Act 1985, s. 395.
14
accepted (‘waived’) by the chargee. The former is a case of estoppel,72 while the latter 
is a case of election waiver. Taking estoppel first, suppose that the chargor forms the 
assumption that it can dispose of some or all of the charged assets without seeking 
consent from the chargee, and that the chargee has either encouraged this assumption, 
or knowing about it, has acquiesced in it. This might happen, for example, if the 
chargor disposes of some part of the collateral openly but without the chargee’s 
consent, and the chargee, through words, actions or omissions, represents to the 
chargor that it will not seek a remedy either for this violation of the chargee’s veto 
rights over disposal or for similar events in the future, unless it is accompanied or 
preceded by some other event (‘the specified event’) (say, the chargor failing to make 
a loan repayment at the appropriate time). If the chargor significantly alters its 
position in reliance on this representation, the chargee is henceforth estopped from 
asserting its right to veto disposals of the collateral by the chargor in the absence of 
the occurrence of the specified event. Put differently, it has released altogether its
right to demand compliance with the provisions in the debenture requiring its consent 
before the chargor may dispose of the collateral.73
The consequences are far-reaching. The chargee has effectively deprived itself of the 
ability, unless the specified event takes place, to assert the right to control disposals of 
the charged assets by the chargor, or in other words, to assert the very right which 
distinguishes a fixed from a floating charge. It must follow, at the point at which this 
right is lost through estoppel, that the fixed charge ceases to exist, and a floating 
charge takes its place, which will crystallise at the occurrence of the specified event 
and at the breach of any of the terms implied into the debenture. Consider the 
alternative, that the charge remains fixed even though the chargee no longer controls 
disposals in the normal course of its business by the chargor of the charged assets. 
This seems clearly inconsistent with the principle in Brumark that the chargee can 
only claim the benefit of a fixed charge if it in fact exercises such control.74 A chargee 
cannot circumvent this requirement simply by placing itself in a position where it 
becomes estopped from being able to exercise a monitoring role over the collateral, 
and thus being required to do so. It also follows therefore that those acquiring rights 
over the charged assets prior to crystallisation would do so free of the chargee’s 
rights. The floating charge which comes into existence at the point at which the 
chargee’s right to veto disposals of the charged assets is lost by estoppel may also, if 
appropriate, need to be registered.75
Finally, consider waiver:76 “the basic proposition is that where two possible remedies 
or courses of action are open to X [the party which has suffered a breach of a term of 
72
 We are concerned with promissory estoppel here, a doctrine whose roots can be traced to the House 
of Lords’ decision in Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Company (1877) 2 App Cas 439, and in modern 
times, of course to Denning J’s judgment in Central London Property Trust v High Trees House [1947] 
KB 130. It might also be looked at as a case of ‘unilateral’ or ‘forbearance’ waiver. Any distinction 
between estoppel and this type of waiver, which is hard enough to draw in any case (see e.g. HIH 
Casualty and General Insurance Limited v Axa Corporate Solutions New Hampshire Insurance 
Company [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 325), is virtually non-existent in this context. 
73
 By analogy, see e.g. Banning v Wright [1972] 1 WLR 972, per Lord Hailsham LC at 97C-D (a case 
of unilateral or forbearance waiver, which, as noted, is indistinguishable from estoppel in this context).
74
 [2001] 2 AC 710, 73B, [48].
75
 See Companies Act 1985, ss. 395 and 396.
76
 We are concerned with election waiver here, for the reasons made apparent in the text. Note also that 
the only waiver relevant in the present context is ex post facto waiver, which happens once the breach 
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its contract by its counterparty Y] and [X] has communicated his intention to follow 
one course or remedy in such a manner as to lead Y to believe that his choice has been 
made, he will not later be permitted to resile from that position”.77 Note that while 
silence alone does not constitute waiver, it might do so when viewed in its 
commercial context, or when it is combined with other contractually significant acts 
or omissions.78 Where property rights in the charged asset are disposed of by the 
chargor without the chargee’s consent, the chargee has a choice (an election) as to 
whether to resort to the remedies available to it, for example by withholding credit, 
demanding repayment or appointing a receiver or administrator. Faced with these 
alternatives, the chargee, explicitly or by continuing to provide credit to the chargor, 
might be taken to have waived its right to pursue any of these remedies. Since its 
justification lies in promoting certainty and finality in contractual dealings, the waiver 
becomes effective immediately, without any need for the chargor to rely on it.79
There are two important differences between this type of waiver and estoppel. First, 
waiver operates only in respect of an individual breach, and the chargee does not lose 
the ability to insist henceforth on strict compliance with its right to veto disposals of 
the collateral by the chargor. Of course if the evidence demonstrates a pattern of 
unilateral dealings with the collateral on part of the chargor followed by ‘waivers’ of 
the sort just mentioned, then the proper conclusion might be that the provision 
requiring the chargee’s consent is a sham or a mere pretence, or that the proper 
interpretation of the parties’ dealings is that the chargee has lost its ability to assert 
this right by variation or estoppel.80 Second, a waiver of this sort does not deprive the 
chargee of all of its rights with respect to the breach, but only those against which it 
has elected. It is important to notice, therefore, that the chargee might still be able to 
assert that the person granted property rights in the collateral (‘the transferee’) as a 
result of the breach takes subject to the chargee’s rights.81 Should the chargee be 
successful in asserting rights against the transferee, the latter may then have a claim 
against the chargor, for example, for total failure of consideration or breach of 
contract. In this case and depending upon the correct interpretation of the terms upon 
which the waiver took place, the chargor might have a claim against the chargee for 
acting inconsistently with the waiver, or in other words, for approbating and 
reprobating.82
in question (here, disposal of the charged assets without the chargee’s consent) has already occurred. 
Waiver ex ante by the chargee of its right to veto the disposal of the charged assets seems to be 
indistinguishable from the chargee in fact providing consent to the disposal.
77 Glencore Grain Limited v Flacker Shipping Limited (The "Happy Day") [2002] EWCA Civ 1068, 
[2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 896, [65]. See also The Kanchenjunga [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 391, per Lord 
Goff at 397-399.
78
 See e.g. Plasticmoda Societa per Azioni v Davidsons (Manchester) Limited [1952] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
527, and Glencore Grain Limited v Flacker Shipping Limited (The "Happy Day") [2002] EWCA Civ 
1068, [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 896, [66].
79
 M.P. Furmston (ed), The Law of Contract (London: Butterworths, 2003) (2nd ed), 298, paragraph 
2.108.
80
 The results flowing from such a conclusion have already been discussed.
81
 This assumes that the transferee cannot claim to be a bona fide purchaser of the legal estate for value. 
The chargee’s ability to claim the assets back from the transferee also assumes that the latter has not 
changed its position in good faith in reliance on receiving those assets.
82
 See e.g. Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Company Limited (1920) 28 CLR 305, 327-328, 
approvingly referred to in Glencore Grain Limited v Flacker Shipping Limited (The "Happy Day")
[2002] EWCA Civ 1068, [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 896, [65].
16
11. Conclusion
The above discussion may be summarised in the following nine propositions:
(1) The characterisation of a charge depends on the proper construction of the 
instrument creating it. It is the relevant intentions of the parties as encapsulated in the 
debenture or other instrument creating the charge that matter. The label attached to the 
charge is just one, fairly weak, bit of evidence as to these intentions. Any intentions 
alleged to be operating extraneously of the debenture are, in general, irrelevant to 
proper characterisation. 
(2) In general, the conduct of the parties subsequent to the creation of the charge is 
irrelevant to its true characterisation. However, it may be relevant to determining 
whether the debenture, taken on its terms, is a sham or a mere pretence, or whether 
the parties by their conduct have altered the terms of their agreement as enshrined in 
the debenture, or waived or become estopped from asserting certain of their rights.
(3) The essential characteristic of a floating charge is the chargor’s right to put assets 
beyond the ambit of the charge without the chargee’s consent.
(4) The essential characteristic of a fixed charge is the existence of sufficient legal 
constraints on the chargor’s ability to put assets beyond the ambit of the charge 
without the chargee’s consent. Looking at it from the latter’s viewpoint, the charge is 
fixed only if the chargee has sufficient control over the charged assets.
(5) The chargee’s control can only be sufficient if it is (a) for the purpose of 
safeguarding the chargee’s security and not merely for some other purpose, (b) not 
inconsistent with the chargor’s legal obligations, and (c) exercised by the chargee in 
its capacity as chargee, and not in some other capacity.
(6) In construing whether the chargee has sufficient control over the charged assets, 
the nature of the assets subjected to the charge may be taken into account if the 
debenture is silent about whether the chargor may unilaterally deal with the assets. 
The more probable it is that the chargor’s business would be paralysed if it were 
prevented from being able to alienate the charged property in the normal course of 
business without the chargee’s consent, the more probable it is that the parties have 
created a floating charge, not a fixed one, other things being equal.
(7) In general, the alienation of assets in order to raise finance falls within the normal 
course of business.
(8) In ascertaining whether the chargee has sufficient control of the charged assets for 
the charge to be fixed security, the debenture must identify the charged property with 
sufficient specificity.
(9) If a clause in the debenture purports to create a fixed charge over several 
categories of asset, some of which clearly could not have been intended to be made 
subject to a fixed charge, then the entire clause is likely to be interpreted as creating a 
floating charge.
